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Abstract 
With developing technological possibilities, IT projects are becoming increasingly ambitious in both goals and scale. Although 
technology itself is enabling easy management of project execution, failure can still occur, particularly with respect to an ample 
number of unique projects. It is argued here that the ampleness and uniqueness of projects provide criteria for such projects to be 
treated differently from smaller-scale enterprises of the same type. Gaps can be identified in the literature with regards to exact 
definitions of project success and failure. It is proposed that three main issues can impact a project’s ecosystem and determine its 
failure, namely, uncertainty, volatility, and unknowns. Based on these aspects, future project performance can be estimated and 
correspondingly managed. At the same time, retrospective assessment of success or failure may be made rigorous based on exact 
definitions. Two case studies of major technological projects are presented and discussed here as examples of theory application. 
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1. Introduction 
According to a 2009 IDC (International Data Corporation) report on Improving IT project outcomes, 25% of IT 
projects experience outright failure1. Based on the same report, up to 50% of the projects require material rework, 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +0-000-000-0000; fax: +0-000-000-0000. 
E-mail address: adamalami2016@gmail.com 
 
  he Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of CENTERIS 2016
63 Adam Alami /  Procedia Computer Science  100 ( 2016 )  62 – 71 
and 20% to 25% do not provide Return On Investment (ROI). Project management is documented to be a major 
cause of IT project failure, whereas it has been part of IT for a long period of time2.  
A 2012 Garner study3 revealed that IT project risk increases with size, namely, that smaller projects are less 
prone to failure than larger ones. Further to this relation, the report sheds light onto the most probable reasons for 
failure. Thus, it was found that a quarter of the unsuccessful IT projects with a budget larger than $350,000 suffered 
due to uncontrollably increasing and non-forecasted budgetary costs. A comparison between such projects, those 
with smaller budgets, and those with budgets over $1M showed that the larger projects have an underperformance 
rate of approximately 50% or more. The definition of success in a project comes from the Standish Group. 
Successfully completed IT projects must be completed at a cost equal to the allocated budget, within the deadline, 
and with complete delivery of the required functionalities. The conclusion of the Gartner report was that only 16.2% 
of the projects met these requirements and partially unsuccessful projects accounted for 52% of the projects under 
investigation, whereas 31% have been declared complete failures.  
At this point, however, experts are divided over a complete and rigorous definition of success and failure4. Such a 
definition is typically made by each respective expert through subjective assumptions and conceptions. For most of 
them, success is equated to achievements, such as on-time and on-budget delivery. Failure, on the other hand, is 
described as a privative, respectively, the absence of success. However, achieving success is relative to each case 
through its dependency on parameters specific to each project. This mentality does not create perfect grounds for 
comparison between projects. Moreover, dichotomy is created by separating various states of success into mutually 
exclusive categories, either success or the lack thereof, namely, failed projects. The present paper proposes that 
success—or its absence—can be measured by using the following key parameters: the initial investment made by 
the sponsoring organization and whether the requirements defined in the beginning have been attained as forecasted. 
Following this proposal, failure occurs when at least a part of the investment must be forfeited (financial loss) and/or 
the agreed-upon deliverables have not been achieved.  
Very little research has attempted an in-depth investigation of failed projects to identify exactly what the factors 
were behind the failure. In this article, we share the analysis of two high-profile projects’ failures. The data was 
gathered from various public sources. Our analysis indicates that the reasons for the failure of some of these projects 
may have included the following:  
1. Unbalanced ecosystems: Projects fail because they cannot survive in their ecosystems. Projects cannot be 
executed in unbalanced ecosystems. A project’s ecosystem must be kept balanced. Signs of disturbance 
introduced to the ecosystem must be detected and managed accordingly5. 
2. Delivering complex transformation is not about meeting the deadlines. Transformations are delivered with 
“roadmaps”, not schedules, and by acknowledging and assessing the magnitude of the change to tailor a 
delivery strategy.  
3. Poor project management practice. 
2. Research methodology 
Grounded Theory methodology employed in this study refers to a method of data collection used in gathering 
qualitative data from secondary sources 6 . Glaser 7  defines Grounded Theory as the implications of signs in 
community relations and the interaction of these symptoms between subjects and their actions. 
Discovering constructs or theories of IT projects’ failures was of interest in this study, and the connection 
between the constructs was reviewed. Thus, the research outcome for this study rose from Grounded Theory. The 
theoretical concern in Grounded Theory involved the pillar of action and relationship among and between various 
types of the complex social units. The study was interested in understanding the whole process rather than individual 
stages or phases. Additionally, the study was concerned with the effect of dynamism in patterns depicted in 
conditions of action or interaction as either internal or external to the process. 
2.1. Data collection  
Two recent, publically known cases of IT project failure were selected to be the subject of this research study: 
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1. The e-Borders project 
2. The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) Instructional Technology Initiative 
This study utilized secondary sources that we initially validated before being engaged in the data analysis. 
Meriam8 distinguishes that materials of all types are helpful to the researcher as they aid understanding, bringing out 
the meaning and enabling discovery of perceptions related to the research problem. Data collection was mainly 
conducted by use of secondary sources bearing previous studies on the research topic, such as public records, news 
articles, published reports, and official statements.  
Yin9 emphasized that secondary documents used should cover a long span of time, several events, and different 
settings. Furthermore, the materials used ought to be mutual and originating from the social usage and should be in 
an orderly manner10. Existing history and data on a project provide an understanding on which researchers work to 
rectify the failures experienced. Documents provide a firm background on historical understandings of the topic 
under study. The dynamic nature of projects requires the knowledge of the evolution of such projects over time. 
Different documents available to the researcher provide a basis for comparison of changes and the clear path of 
development6. 
2.2. Data Analysis 
This critical step involves results and selecting, appraisal, and interpretation of data contained in the data 
collection. The analysis provides data, extracts, or quotations, or the whole document can be organized into main 
categories via content being analysed under each category 11 . The analytical procedure commences with the 
keywords and giving out their meanings, identifying concepts and their magnitude as used in data, and creating 
subsections that mainly deal with a case study on a sub-phenomenon. Strauss and Corbin12 offer three methods of 
experimenting with the meaning of the keywords and phrases during data analysis: (1) open coding, which refers to 
a process where concepts are identified as well as discovering their dimensions and properties; (2) axial coding, a 
process of creating substances besides linking them with dimensions and properties; and (3) selective coding, which 
involves refining and integrating the theory by utilizing categories besides their linkage with the sub-categories to 
develop a type of case study of a particular sub-phenomena.  
Additionally, Strauss and Corbin9 confirm that it is necessary to observe theoretical sampling to ensure that all 
categories are well represented in the survey. Again, there is the need for re-evaluation of themes and sub-themes at 
each section to ensure the samples are representative of the classes of Grounded Theory analysis. The categories and 
topics used in the study formed the hypothesis or research question via an approach called selective coding.  
 
3. Case studies 
3.1. Case I: The e-Borders Project 
This section presents a case study of the e-Borders programme, initiated in 2003 by the Home Office with the 
purpose to implement a novel and superior border control in the United Kingdom. In 2007 the £750 million 
initiative was contracted to Raytheon Systems. Three years later, in 2010, the Home Office was unsatisfied with the 
project execution and initiated its termination.  
The programme’s goal was the creation of a technological border control system13, which allowed for addressing 
various legal issues that stopped inter-agency information sharing14. Another important aspect was to create a better 
base for the use of the existing resources, allocated at the time in disproportionate numbers to arrivals control. This 
would have resulted in increased capacity of airports15. The project had a demographic side that implied storage of 
information regarding the UK citizens crossing the border. At the same time, passengers could have been assessed in 
advance of physical arrival due to British inter-agency cooperation16. The main business requirements of the e-
Borders project were a) increased effectiveness of border control resources in use through need-based allocation; b) 
identification, refusal of entry, and removal of inadmissible individuals; and c) inter-agency information sharing and 
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deployment regarding targets identified by the system as potential threats or persons of interest. Further, cost savings 
and reduced smuggled goods penetration into the country have been expected of the project17,18.  
The environment of the project was structured around political and social needs, such as improved control of the 
safety of UK citizens. A cooperation of border control with intelligence services was seen as an improvement over 
the then-current practices. Within this environment, the Home Office was the stakeholder, and Raytheon Systems 
was the project supplier. Serco and IBM were enrolled as suppliers in e-Borders to replace Raytheon after contract 
termination.  
The e-Borders project initiative originated from 2003, when it was intended for passenger data collection for all 
traffic going into and out of the UK. The precursor of the e-Borders deployment was the Semaphore pilot, which 
was deemed to be a success in 2006. Consequently, the HOGIB (Home Office Group Investment Board) released 
the funding for the full e-Borders version of the programme. In November 2007 Raytheon Systems won the contract 
that allowed the company to implement the programme for the next four-year period. Based in the United States, 
Raytheon focused its core business on defence and technology11. In 2010 the contract of £750 million had missed 
multiple successive milestones and had problems with the service quality, for which reason the Home Office 
decided to terminate it19.  
The quantitative performance indicators that had not been achieved were a) 95% of data of incoming and 
outgoing passengers to be collected prior to arrival at the border for analysis by the end of 2010 and 100% by the 
first quarter of 2014 and b) integrate the two then-currently existing systems within one system by April 201116. In 
fact, not a single milestone had been delivered by the termination of the contract despite the scheduled timeline. 
Instead of the 95% target, the project only managed to track and record 86% of the data.  
The requirement analysis was executed in detail only after Raytheon was awarded the contract, designs being in 
place before detailed requirements were known with exactitude. Overly ambitious promises were made, mostly 
based on lack of understanding of the precise project needs and sheer time pressure due to the Olympics. What the 
project involved was to collect, analyse, and compare data originated in 200 million transits per year and to 
coordinate data from 30 departments of the government and 600 rail, ferry, and air carriers. Moreover, key 
personnel left the project very often, a fact that combined with micromanagement from ministers and other officials 
of the government. 
The project had to be fast-tracked due to the 2012 London Olympic Games, when a large supplementation of 
arrivals was expected. During the same period, Raytheon Systems sued the Home Office for wrongful termination. 
After four years of hearings, Raytheon received a favourable court decision that ordered them to be paid £224M 
representing wrongful cessation rights and accrued interest, a decision that was attacked by the Home Office. 
Finally, a settlement has been reached. While it can be argued that the sheer number of stakeholders made proper 
stakeholder management impossible, a similarly simple counterargument can point out that IBM and Serco 
succeeded in the same conditions.  
3.2. Case II: LAUSD Instructional Technology Initiative  
This section presents a case study of Instructional Technology Initiative (ITI) by the Los Angeles Unified School 
District (LAUSD). The challenges leading to the failure of the ITI project in the school district, the consequences 
resulting from the IT project failure, and the actions that have been taken to manage the effects of the failure are 
briefly discussed here.  
Handing out of iPads as part of the Instructional Technology Initiative was considered to be one of the most 
ambitious rollouts of technology in schools. Through technology resources, ITI sought to offer lessons, assignments, 
assessment, and contents aligned to the Common Core State Standards20. As part of the initiative, the external 
vendors and internal district staff were to provide professional development to support school-based leadership for 
the initiative. LAUSD entered into a contract with Apple to provide iPad devices to 650,000 students in the district 
as part of a digital transformation in education through a bundled digital curriculum by Pearson Education21.  
ITI implementation began in 2013. At that particular time, it was identified as the Common Core Technology 
Project. The expected results of the ITI project were to provide tools/devices to educators so as to advance the 
learning of the students and create a learning space designed and formulated to increase engagement of the 
learners22. The initiative was expected to offer support for the implementation of the Common Core State Standard 
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through the provision of an opportunity to all students so as to engage with interactive support and digital curricula 
together with adaptive assessments. Also, LAUSD sought to close the gap in the digital divide by ensuring that 21st  
century technology is accessible to all students25. 
The expected outcomes were facilitated through the provision of technological resources to schools by the 
district. To ensure the safety of students, various policies and procedures were adopted. Also, resources were 
committed to supporting school teachers and leaders in using the technology for instruction23.  
On behalf of LAUSD, Superintendent John Deasy—a year into his tenure and seeking to overturn the school 
system crisis—initiated talks with Pearson PLC with the intention to work on a digital transformation in public 
education in 2012. This was an urgent mandate because a) more than 10,000 students were dropping out of high 
school every year; b) fewer than half of students were reading at grade level; and c) teachers, librarians, and 
counsellors in Los Angeles lost their jobs as a result of the recession. Pearson showcased still under development 
software meant to revolutionize education through videos, games, and interactive elements19. In March 2013 
LAUSD put the project out for public bid under the name of the Common Core Technology, where the $1.3 billion 
contract was won by Pearson and Apple on June 24, 2013. The two companies won after district school staff 
committees picked them from 19 total bids18. Under the contract, Apple was tasked with providing iPads bundled 
with Pearson-developed digital curriculum resources. The goal was to have the 650,000 students endowed with 
iPads. 
Pearson was selected on the basis of curriculum samples based on the contract, respectively math and English 
only24. The bundling of the curriculum and the device contributed to the rising cost of the project, where an 
additional $200 was expensed per each iPad, which stood at $76825. The initial adoption of ITI through iPad rollout 
faced challenges from the initial adoption. The Pearson curriculum software was designed “in vitro”, yet they gave 
assurance that the program works under certain implementation purposes21. Based on technological overview, it is 
hard to create a program that enhances learning while supporting all the practicalities25 of schools. Time-consuming 
distribution and collection of iPads each day and overnight security presented a tremendous challenge to most 
schools. Tracking who had returned the devices presented a formidable task, whereas loss would hinder children 
from learning25. Tablets breached school security, including websites access (e.g., YouTube or Facebook). Fewer 
than 5% of the students had access to content, a fact attributed to technical issues. Frequent disruption of access was 
common, whereas the provided materials were not suited for students with low English proficiency. Neither 
utilization guides nor progress tests were available online, whereas Pearson was not tracking the program usability19. 
In March 2014 nearly all schools had stopped the usage of Pearson curriculum due to crippling technical problems 
and incompleteness21. 
Due to immense pressure and criticism, Deasy resigned from the school district in October 201418. In December 
2014 LAUSD officially terminated the contract with Apple as a result of frequent problems on the daily use of the 
curriculum, which frequently interrupted normal learning in schools. Based on these problems and following the 
termination of the contract, LAUSD sought a refund from Apple. Through its attorneys, the district required a 
closed-door meeting to explore possible litigation against the two companies. Pearson was included as a 
subcontractor to Apple because they developed the curriculum18. In September 2015 Apple agreed to repay $4.2M 
to settle the litigation filed by LAUSD. Apple would have earned a total of $30M upon completion of the first 
phase26. The Board of Education agreed that the money repaid by Apple would be used to acquire computers within 
a new program. 
4. Findings 
Beyond a phenomenological description of project management as a process, the discipline should firstly be 
defined as the endeavour to produce deliverables in a complex ecosystem dominated by a) frequent changes in 
scope, b) uncertainty, c) unknowns, and d) complexity.  
The failure of the e-Borders case was due to suboptimal management, adverse ecosystem conditions combined 
with poor risk management, and multiple failures in execution. Although LAUSD seemed to have a relatively 
balanced ecosystem, it failed to deliver its mandate. The project was a victim of its simplistic view on execution. It 
had a genuine idea but lacked the know-how of project execution. 
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4.1. Ecosystem survival 
Structures that become manifest in the interdependencies between entities and resources can be described as 
ecosystems. Some of the entities may be persons, such as stakeholders, whereas the resources can originate in the 
business requirements or the culture of the organization. Due to their inherent differences, projects function within 
their unique ecosystems. Each part of an ecosystem has its own impact during the execution phase. At the same 
time, ecosystems have their own intrinsic dynamics, whereas certain parts of ecosystems can manifest 
unpredictability and volatility, particularly during transitions.  
A highly stable ecosystem will favour flawless execution. Unstable dynamics, on the other hand, are prone to 
create environments unfavourable for delivery. A good example of such unstable dynamics inside a programme 
ecosystem is the e-Borders case. In that case, the instability was reflected in poor execution and difficulties in 
survival. Suboptimal management was performed on the volatility determinants, the unknowns, and uncertainty 
inside the programme27.  
According to the National Audit Office report28, the desired outcome was to maximally strengthen the border 
security by the middle of 2011. For this reason, the Department “felt it was necessary to be ambitious on scope and 
timescale”. The realism and proper risk management have been sacrificed in favour of political ambition. 
Consequently, the failure occurred through lack of acknowledgement regarding important parts of the programme 
ecosystem. An imbalanced dynamical ecosystem can easily be perturbed by further disturbances introduced by the 
participating actors. In this case, the pressure created by ambition and the neglect of realism introduced fragility into 
the ecosystem. The main actors have been further motivated and pressured to follow through with the original vision 
that had been set and carry on with its lack of realism.  
The initial stages of requirements analysis and scheduling were impacted by the existing political ambition. Thus, 
the NAO23 analysis, based on the financial estimations of Raytheon, stated that the profit would have been reduced 
by 50% after a three-month delay. Even if the schedule was followed, the profit generation would have only started 
in 2012. Although the design proposal was included in the contract, it was based on insufficiently detailed 
requirements and therefore led to post-contract-awarding disputes generated by lack of confidence over whether the 
needs could be covered by the proposal or not. Despite the undoubtedly good intentions of the Home Office, 
ambition has overthrown realism, a fact attested to by this behaviour.  
4.1.1. Volatility 
 
Many projects are impacted by scope creep and frequent requirement modifications. These aspects are all 
encompassed by the concept of volatility. Insufficient predictability creates dynamics that impact execution and 
deliverables. Processes aimed at finding and developing solutions suffer most from volatility, a phenomenon that 
typically is directly proportional to the volatility degree. Although little control can be exerted on volatility, some 
instances may be managed or averted.   
The NAO report23 noted that multiple and significant functionality changes impacted the border security project 
during a period of twelve years. Unforeseen technical aspects have proved challenging for the programme, which 
was unable to adjust to the constraints and requirements. As is the case when requirements are insufficiently 
documented, design work was performed prior to the project team being fully aware of the technical specifications. 
Under-developed requirements were wrongly used as a working assumption throughout the design phase, which 
amplified the background dynamics of the ecosystem.   
Major transformations are equivalent to complex projects and are consequently exposed to more vulnerability to 
volatile conditions. The volatility is proportional to the amount of information that requires processing and 
integration. Another reason behind volatility in complex projects is the possibility to see discrete jumps between one 
requirement eliciting stage and the next. The working assumption is always that the requirements have been fully 
extracted and documented before moving on to the design stage, and therefore they will not be modified. In fact, this 
is not the case for all projects. The most complex projects always imply a minimal modicum of unpredictability and 
uncertainty during execution stages.  
68   Adam Alami /  Procedia Computer Science  100 ( 2016 )  62 – 71 
4.1.2. Uncertainty 
 
Typically, projects execution implies working with known unknowns. These can be defined as the uncertainty 
level of the project. For example, this category encompasses the known risks that may impact the project while at 
the same time lacking a clear estimation of the consequences of the impact. The e-Borders case saw organizational 
transformation, variability within the working ecosystem29, and the termination of the Raytheon contract, among 
other events. Lacking a clear understanding of the impact of these events on the execution phase rendered them 
unmanageable.    
4.1.3. Unknowns 
 
The e-Borders and LAUSD projects faced multiple unknowns throughout their lifecycle. The unknowns typically 
are expected to be unexplored business needs or project-specific constrains and rules. A large density of unknowns 
trailing into the design stage increases the future volatility of the business requirements.  
4.2. Execution 
 
A delivery process staged and run with the purpose of supplying the required beneficial outcomes is the 
execution phase. In the case of the e-Borders programme, the delivery did not follow textbook recommendations on 
project management. Notably, the NAO23 report describes the execution of the e-Borders programme as lacking 
strategy. The Home Office did not carry out the project as a business transformation due to simplified ideas and an 
outline-only approach to the implementation of a complex situation. 
LAUSD, on the other hand, seemed to have a chaotic and relaxed approach to the execution of the program. 
LAUSD did not take ownership of the execution. It had a simplistic understanding of delivering such a complex 
“digital transformation”.  
4.2.1. Business transformation 
 
Typically, transformations are endeavoured according to road maps instead of schedules. For e-Borders, the focus 
was to obtain a specific outcome rather than to operate a change at a structural level. No road map has been 
developed for the vision of the programme or for the transformation. The NAO reported an overly ambitious 
timeframe and no clearly defined scope and implementation strategy. Furthermore, there are signs that the Home 
Office did not have a good estimation of the magnitude of the change applied to its operational model. At the same 
time, the project dynamics and unstable ecosystem needed a well-developed strategy to implement the 
transformation in the ranks of the employees and into the technology, risk and data management, and process 
aspects.  
Similarly, LAUSD had no strategy to deliver its “digital transformation”. Its idea of delivering a transformation 
implied selecting the vendors to provide the hardware and the software. The simplistic view of “plug it in and it will 
work” was suicidal. 
4.2.2. Managing complexity 
 
The success of a project is a direct consequence of the organisation’s ability to understand, anticipate, and 
successfully find ways to overcome the complexity of a project. The e-Borders project failed by not managing 
complexity carefully enough, as noted by the NAO report, which mentions “poorly understood complexities”. The 
complexity increases with uncertainty and limiting factors. Another important aspect particularly visible in the case 
of e-Borders was the uniqueness of the attempt.  
Of utmost importance, a coherent vision and its implementation define the capabilities and maturity of a project’s 
organisation. Maturity and capabilities develop while the organisation integrates experience into knowledge by 
learning. The novelty of a project is a major challenge when the experience with similar endeavours is on the low 
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side of the spectrum. While failing to acknowledge the uniqueness that posited a challenge for the e-Borders case, 
the Home Office contributed yet another factor to the final failure.  
 
4.3. Project management practice 
 
The practices and knowledge related to project management are widely documented and accessible to all, and yet 
most projects are not managed with these principles in mind30. The project management practice areas neglected by 
e-Borders were as follows: (1) proper practice of stakeholder management, (2) feasibility assessments, and (3) the 
extraction and analysis of requirements. Much in the same way, LAUSD provider Pearson Education accepted the 
plug-and-play mentality behind the simplistic requirements of the management of schools. Consequently, they 
offered nothing in the way of an integrated and manageable experience that could have offered support to the users.  
4.3.1. Stakeholder management 
 
Sponsors and stakeholders that are not maintained close and engaged with the project are prone to contribute to 
the failure rather than the success of the endeavour. On the contrary, involving a wide variety of end users and 
attempting to engage key stakeholders is critical for projects. Improper stakeholder management will result in 
alienation and resentment of the stakeholders towards the project. 
The e-Borders project clearly lacked a focused strategy for managing stakeholders since stakeholders critical for 
the project did not receive proper rapport management and communication. For instance, a critical relation that was 
given insufficient attention was that with the transportation carriers. This was acknowledged in the NAO report, 
which noted that the project base of assumptions did not include proper stakeholder management. Similarly, 
LAUSD failed to engage the end users of the project output: teachers and schools. The district ran the programme in 
silo. 
4.3.2. Feasibility 
 
The Home Office and LAUSD had concepts rather than a well-developed set of requirements. As opposed to 
requirements, concepts have to be compared against the realities of the situation. Although a pilot project was in 
place with the purpose to perform a realistic evaluation and a feasibility study, this did not cover the wide range of 
implications and solutions that the project involved23. Thus, some areas were neglected, and the final deployment 
was made with only approximate knowledge, leading to disputes.  
4.3.3. Requirements 
 
In both cases, the programmes’ execution was based on a proposed blueprint design rather than real needs or a 
realistic and tested concept. In cases where the exact needs cannot be identified and documented, the requirement 
analysis will always suffer. This is a major shift from ideal conditions, where precise business requirements can be 
pinpointed. Although the Home Office was able to present a concept in the e-Borders case, this concept was not 
accompanied by precise requirements. This has been noted by the NAO report, which stated that the project was not 
guided by clear ideas regarding which modifications should be operated on the business processes.  
When the requirements are complex, a significant amount of time must be invested in the initial need collecting 
and analysis phase. The time investment is beneficial and can be recovered since the subsequent complexity will be 
reduced by this analysis. During the period in which requirements are defined and evaluated, stakeholders have the 
opportunity to explore their consequences and the unknowns, thus increasing the possibility to reach an informed 
decision31. As noted by NAO, the design suggested by Raytheon was attached to the contract, although it was not 
clear whether it could satisfy all the needs of the project, and it was founded on high-level analyses of requirements. 
Consequently, it can be argued that e-Borders lacked in the area of a stable and well-defined requirement 
management process. This created a volatile ecosystem containing two oppositely working partners: Raytheon often 
perceived the requirements as shifting, whereas the Department considered the provider’s solutions to be 
insufficient. This background generated disputes and conflict in the interpretation of various parts of the agreement.  
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The Pearson curriculum software, on the other hand, was designed in a vacuum. The schools’ needs were not 
analysed and documented. The schools had different ways of running curricula. Consequently, the software could 
not have dealt with all the practicalities taking place in schools32.   
 
5. Conclusion  
In the context of increasingly more complex Information Technology projects being supported by developing 
technology, endeavours undertaken by programme management experts have become larger and more ambitious. As 
one would expect, better technology creates a strong support for such large-scale projects to be executed. However, 
unique or massive projects still see frequent failure.  
There is no consensus about how project failure and success should be defined. It is either subjectively defined or 
left to assumptions and interpretations. There have been various failed projects in the IT industry that memorably 
began as game-changers in the industry but instead failed to achieve all their objectives, resulting in significant 
losses by the respective companies.  
Only a few research papers have attempted an in-depth investigation of failed projects to identify the exact 
factors behind the failure. In this article, we analysed two high-profile projects’ failures. The data was gathered from 
various public sources. Grounded Theory was used to perform this research using the qualitative data collected from 
documents’ analysis. 
The present paper discussed some theoretical considerations and applied them to two case studies involving 
massive public service sector projects in the United States (LAUSD ITI) and the United Kingdom (e-Borders).  
The e-Borders project failed when its ecosystem became unbalanced; hence survival became difficult. Projects’ 
ecosystems are a reflection of the real world and are characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and 
unknowns. We can safely assume that when a project fails to manage one or more of these characteristics, its 
ecosystem becomes unbalanced. However, projects lack self-awareness of their ecosystem and its troubles. 
LAUSD did not perform well in the areas of research and development, where the stakeholders focused on 
involving two companies to provide a one-size-fits-all solution18. The school district failed to understand that 
technology does not work in this miraculous and simplified way22. Instead, the project should have been about 
implementing a transformation, which requires thorough planning and good project management practice. 
Organizations improve their delivery capacity by acquiring knowledge from past experiences. Each project 
failure must be investigated to deduce the true causes of the failure and hence a lesson(s) learnt for future projects33. 
Organizations’ future projects will have similarities in their ecosystems’ compositions as projects’ ecosystems are 
instantiated partially from the organization ecosystem. 
Organizations prefer to turn the page after a failure. The assumption that each project is a unique instance is true. 
However, the project’s ecosystem will be, to a great extent, similar for future projects. What made a project fail in its 
ecosystem is a survival lesson for a future project. 
Failures are opportunities to learn and improve. Each failure should be investigated and lessons drawn for future 
projects’ executions. Knowledge about failure will strengthen an organization’s project management execution and 
practice. What future research is needed to understand why projects fail? How can failure be converted into a 
learning opportunity? And how can lessons learnt be implemented into future projects? 
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